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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
CARLA K. PARKER,
Petitioner/Appellee,

:

CASE NO. 981362 -- CA

:

PRIORITY NO. 15

vs.
DALE S. PARKER,
Respondent/Appellant.
DALE S. PARKER, hereinafter "husband" or "appellant",
submits the following Brief:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from multiple orders in a domestic
relations case entered by the Third Judicial District Court.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant Rules
3 and 4 of the
3(2) (h)

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE

UTAH CODE ANN.

and to §78-2a-

(1998).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

entering a bifurcated order granting the divorce of the
parties and reserving the remaining issues for trial where

1
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the Appellant objected due to prejudice.

The standard of

review for this issue is an abuse of discretion standard.
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., LTD. v. Smith's Food £ Drug
Ctrs.. Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App. 1994); BreuerHarrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 730 (Utah App. 1990);
King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah 1988).
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

ordering that the date of valuation of the marital estate
would be April 15, 1996, the date of the bifurcated decree,
rather than the date of the trial.

The standard of review

for this issue is an abuse of discretion standard.

Peck v.

Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that
where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value,
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under
its broad discretion, value the property at a date other
than the date of divorce.)
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to divide the parties' various bank accounts as part
of the marital estate or the value thereof, given the
substantial monies involved and the fact that Appellee
controlled the monies in said accounts.

The standard of

review for this issue is that changes to a trial court's
2
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property distribution in a divorce case "will be made only
if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse
of discretion,"

Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146

(Utah App. 1988) (citing English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,
410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah
App. 1987)) .
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in

failing to award the parties' interest in Murray Parkway,
LLC, equally rather than to Appellee where the value of the
interest was difficult to determine and speculative?

The

standard of review for this issue is that changes to a trial
court's property distribution in a divorce case "will be
made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error,
the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion."

Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146 (citing

English, 565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397).

3
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Appellant submits that there are no statutory or
constitutional provisions determinative of the issues
presented herein.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
This is an appeal from the final orders as contained in

the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Supplement Decree of Divorce, Order of Custody, Property
Settlement and Other Related Matters, both dated April 27,
1998 and entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sandra N.
Peuler, Third District Court Judge, presiding, and from the
final order entitled Order Denying Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in Chief to Take
Additional Testimony; Denying Motion for Clarification and
Motion For a New Trial; and Order Denying Objections to
Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Divorce and Other Related Matters, dated May
29, 1998.

Further, this is an appeal from orders entered

prior to the final orders, including the Order Bifurcating

4
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Divorce, dated March 6, 1996, Order on Respondent's
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, dated April 1,
1996, the bifurcated Decree of Divorce, dated April 15, 1996
and the Order in Re: Evaluation Date, dated February 2 6,
1998-

The orders, permitted the earlier award and

bifurcation of a Decree of Divorce, ordered the valuation
date for purposes of value of the marital estate to be the
date of the bifurcated Divorce of April 15, 1996. A Notice
of Appeal was filed by the Appellant on June 24, 1998
subsequent to the post-trial order dated May 29, 1998.
Appellee filed for divorce in the lower court on October
31, 1995.

Temporary orders were entered based upon

stipulation.

Appellee filed a Motion to Bifurcate the

divorce action to grant her a Decree of Divorce. Appellant
opposed the motion at the time of hearing before the
Honorable Third District Court Commissioner Thomas N.
Arnett, Jr., but a bifurcated divorce was recommended and an
Order Bifurcating Divorce was entered on March 6, 1996.
Appellant objected to the Commissioner's recommendation
which granted the Bifurcated Decree and requested a hearing
on his motion.

The Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler denied

the Objection and the Motion for Hearing indicating that
5
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Appellant would not be prejudiced by the court's granting of
the bifurcation while recognizing that Appellant disputed
the bifurcation insofar as it may effect property awarded to
the parties at the trial on this matter.
131.

Index, pg. 130-

A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was awarded on April

15, 1996.
A pre-trial hearing and motion came before the court on
the determination of the valuation date for purposes of
valuing the marital estate on July 11, 1997 and a Minute
Entry issued on that date, though the order arising from the
hearing was not signed until February 26, 1998; which
ordered that the date of the bifurcated Divorce was the date
of valuation of the marital assets and estate.
All issues attendant to the divorce came on regularly
for trial on July 31, 1997, August 1, 1997, October 23,
1997, October 24, 1997 and October 28, 1997. The court took
the matter under advisement and a Minute Entry Memorandum
Decision was issued by the court dated December 10, 1997.
The Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and entered by
the court on April 27, 1998.
Subsequent to the divorce trial and prior to the Judge's
6
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Minute Entry decision, the Appellant filed a Verified Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in
Chief to take additional testimony.

Subsequent to the

Minute Entry decision of the court, the Appellant also filed
a Motion for Clarification and Motion for New Trial and
Objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce.

The post-trial motions came

on for hearing on April 27, 1998 and the Order arising from
the post-trial motions was entered by the court May 29,
1998.
Appeal.

From these orders, the Appellant has filed a timely
(The Order Bifurcating Divorce is attached hereto

and designated as Addendum "A".

The Order on Respondent's

Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation is attached
hereto and designated as Addendum "B". The Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached
hereto, designated as Addendums "C" and "D", respectively.
The July 11, 1997 Minute Entry and the Order in Re:
Evaluation Date are attached hereto, designated as Addendums
"E" and "F", respectively.

The Supplemental Decree of

Divorce and Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law are attached hereto, designated as Addendums "G" and
"H", respectively.

The Order Denying Motion for Temporary
7

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in Chief to take
additional testimony; Order Denying Motion for Clarification
and Motion for New Trial; and Order Denying Objection to
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce and Other Related Matters is attached hereto and
designated as Addendum

"I".)

B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married to each other March 26, 1971.
(R. 1)• The parties separated in mid-October, 1995.
R. 1022, p. 16, 11. 19-23).
divorce on October 31, 1995.

(R. 1,

Appellee filed a complaint for
(R. 1). At the time of the

parties' separation, both the Appellee and the Appellant
owned numerous parcels of real property, either solely or
jointly-

The Appellant prepared Defendant's Exhibit "10"

which exhibit reflected all real estate owned by both or
either of the parties as of April, 1996, exclusive of three
building projects that the Appellant was working on at that
time.

(Said exhibit is attached hereto, designated as

Addendum V " ) .
1-6).

(R. 1025, p. 691, 11. 17-25 and p. 692, 11.

The properties included real estate at 2214

Bonniebrook, which was a duplex that the Appellant testified
was purchased with a $10,000-00 gift for the down payment
8
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from the Appellant's parents.

(R. 1025, p. 692, 11. 7-14).

That property was in the Appellee's name only, though the
parties had treated the property in all respects as a joint
investment and Appellant put a great deal of time and work
into that duplex.

(R. 1025, p. 693, 11. 1-25 and p. 694,

11. 1-4). The mortgage on the property was paid for out of
the parties' joint account.

(R. 1025, p. 694, 11. 7-10).

The second property at 6305 South 1300 West in Murray
was in both parties' names. (R. 1025, p. 696, 11. 1-5). It
was this property in which Appellant resided subsequent to
the separation.

(R. 1025, p. 657, 11. 10-11).

Another

property was Lot 105, Borgs Mountain View, which was in the
Appellant's name.

(R. 1025, p. 700, 11. 17-25).

Further,

the parties had a partial interest in an Idaho property
known as Lot 10, Almost Heaven, which was actually in the
name of the Appellee's brother.
17).

(R. 1025, p. 704, 11. 5-

The parties also owned a one-half interest in 83 acres

in Kooskia, Idaho.
11. 1-12).

(R. 1025, p. 706, 11. 15-25 and p. 707,

The parties also had a property at 1772 Dove

Hollow Circle which the Appellant constructed and which was
in the name of Appellee.

(R. 1025, p. 708, 11. 16-25).

This is the property in which Appellee resided subsequent to
9
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the separation.

(R. 1022, p. 13, 11. 5-8).

Another property of the parties was a 1/6 interest in
the Appellee's business building at 150 East Vine Street
which was not in the Appellant's name.
11. 15-25 and p. 717, 11. 21-23).

(R. 1025, p. 716,

The parties also owned a

property at 1070 Denver Street which had Appellee's name on
the title as well as one of their children but was paid for
by the parties.

(R. 1025, p. 717, 11. 24-25 and p. 718, 11.

1-25 and p. 719, 11. 1-5).
At the time of the parties' divorce there was also a
real property known as Lot 7, River Bluff Estates, Spokane,
Washington which was in the name of the Appellee, only.

The

Appellant did not even know of the existence of the property
until some time during the divorce action.

(R. 1025, p.

716, 11. 2-8). Appellee arranged for a Quit Claim Deed to
be prepared, purporting to be signed by the Appellant, quit
claiming his interest in the property.

This was done

without Appellant's knowledge and the signature was not his,
though it was notarized.

This action by Appellee was

testified to by Appellant (R. 1025, p. 715, 11. 21-25 and p.
716, 1. 1) and by Tamara Torkelson.

(R. 1022, p. 160, 11.

16-25 and p. 161, 11. 1-25 and p. 162, 11. 1-24).
10
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Ms.

Torkelson testified that the Appellee did not want the
Appellant to know about the real property and the Quit Claim
Deed was signed by someone other than the Appellant and Ms.
Torkelson then had an employee of hers, notarize the
document.

Ms. Torkelson also testified that the Appellee

had informed her approximately three years prior to the time
of trial of an intent on Appellee's part to put money in her
sister's name or somebody's name to hide it from Appellant.
(R. 1022, p. 163, 11. 14-25 and p. 164, 11. 1-11).
Lastly, at the time of the parties' divorce the parties
had an interest in a partnership known as Murray Parkway
LLC, which is a development company comprised of 33 acres in
Murray, Utah which is pasture land which had been owned by
Appellant's parents and family for many years.
764, 11. 19-25).

(R. 1026, p.

The Murray Parkway property is next to the

Appellant's parents home and right behind the home in which
Appellant resides.

(R. 1026, p. 765, 11. 3-10).

It was

partly the location of the property which led the Appellant
to try to acquire the property for development. (R. 1026, p. •
765, 11. 11-21).

Prior to the acquisition of the property,

the parties had numerous conversations and agreed that they
should have a partner, Martin Merrill, for financial
11
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backing.

(R. 1026, p. 766, 11. 3-14).

Prior to purchasing

the property, the Appellant had conversations regarding the
purchase with his father alone, and after his father had a
stroke, the financial arrangements were made with his
mother.

(R. 1026, p. 767, 11. 10-21).

Appellant testified

that his name, while on the Earnest Money Agreement was not
on the Murray Parkway, LLC, documents, because it made no
difference to him whether his name appeared as a member.
(R. 1026, p. 769, 11. 24-25 and p. 770, 11. 1-8). The
Appellant testified that Appellee took actions after the
separation to commence the development of the project
without his involvement (R. 1026, p. 769, 11. 15-23), but
that Appellant intended to be involved in the project.
1026, p. 770, 11. 21-23).

(R.

Further, the Appellant was asked

if he believed that the value of the Murray Parkway project
could be ascertained at the time of divorce. Appellant
testified that he believed it's future worth was between one
and two million dollars, in profit.

His testimony was

objected to Appellee's attorney and the judge sustained the
objection indicating that she did not believe that the
Appellant had the expertise as a developer to testify
regarding the value.

However, the court clearly heard the
12
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testimony of the Appellant that he did not believe that the
appraised value of the land itself at April 15, 1996, was
the true value of the LLC.
to.

This testimony was not objected

(R. 1026, p. 771, 11. 2-5, p. 770, 11. 24-25, p. 771,

11. 1-25, p. 772, 11. 1-25, and p. 773, 11. 1-12).
The Appellant testified at trial that he believed that
the court should divide the parties' 50% interest in the
Murray Parkway project, one-half to each so that each would
be "members" with a 25% interest. Appellant specifically
testified that he believed that this division was fair and
that the judge should not value the property at its value at
April 15, 1996 because of the profits that were going to be
realized when the development was completed.
774, 11. 6-18).

(R. 1026, p.

In his testimony, Appellant agreed that he

should participate and pay one-half of any and all monies or
costs that may have been paid out since the parties'
bifurcated divorce, so that he would participate in one-half
of any out of pocket expenses with the 50% partner, Martin
Merrill.

(R. 1026, p. 774, 11. 6-18).

Martin Merrill testified that he was the past partner
with Appellee in the Sunrise Flats project and her current
partner in the Murray Parkway project.

(R. 1023, p. 308,

13
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11. 24-25 and p. 309, 11. 1-10).
Mr. Merrill testified that in the course of operating
the Sunrise Flats investment with Appellee that he
maintained the checking account (R. 1023, p. 323, 1. 25 and
p. 324, 11. 1-2). Defendant's Exhibit 36 reveals a
distribution from the Sunrise Flats account to the Appellee,
Carla K. Parker, on September 21, 1995 in the sum of
$91,666.67, which Mr. Merrill testified was a return of her
investment.

(R. 1023, p. 324, 11. 14-21).

Mr. Merrill also

testified to additional distributions from the Sunrise Flats
account to Carla K. Parker of $7,000.00 on September 11,
1995, $10,000.00 on September 20, 1995 and $7,250.00 in
December, 1995.

(A copy of the Appellant's exhibit is

attached hereto, designated as Addendum "K").

Mr. Merrill

testified that those distributions pretty much closed up the
project known as Sunrise Flats.

(R. 1023, p. 327, 11. 9-

25) .
Mr. Merrill testified that the parties and he started
discussing the Murray Parkway project five or six years
prior to the time of trial and that there were discussions
with Appellant's parents that did not always involve him.
(R. 1023, p. 316, 11. 1-14).

Mr. Merrill testified that the
14
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original Earnest Money Agreement indicated that "Murray
Parkway LLC, will be formed after this offer is accepted.
It will consist of Marin Merrill, Dale Parker and/or Carla
Parker."

(R. 1023, p. 317, 11. 18-24).

Mr. Merrill

testified that he was present when Mr. Parker's parents
signed the final Uniform Real Estate Contract which is
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 (attached as Addendum "L") and that
Doug Parker, Appellant's father, signed with an "X".

(R.

1023, p. 318, 11. 14-24) .
The Uniform Real Estate Contract that was entered into
between the parties and Appellant's parents was a noninterest bearing note with a $50,000.00 down payment, and
Mr. Merrill testified that Appellee, Carla Parker, suggested
to him that an additional $50,000.00 payment be made on the
note in June of 1996, even though the contract did not
require the same. (R. 1023, p. 330, 11. 17-25 and p. 331,
11. 1-17).

While Mr. Merrill testified that Appellant

expressed no interest in being a "member" of the LLC, he
also testified that the Appellant made it clear that he
wanted to be involved in the project and that his role in
the project was as a part owner and co-developer along with
the Appellee and Mr. Merrill.

(R. 1023, p. 332, 11. 13-22).
15
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Mr. Merrill also testified that the signatures of Leone and
Doug Parker, Appellant's parents, on the Uniform Real Estate
Contract were notarized a day or two later at his office.
The notarization did not occur as it should have, in the
presence of the Parkers.

(R. 1023, p. 333, 11. 13-25 and p.

334, 11. 1-8). At the time of trial, Mr. Merrill testified
that all original documents were being held in escrow with
his company, Merrill Title Company.
21-25).

(R. 1023, p. 335, 11.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract had not been filed

at the time of trial and neither had any notice of interest
(R. 1023, p. 336, 11. 4-9) .
At the conclusion of his testimony, Mr. Merrill was
asked if, during this time, he had a relationship with
Appellee of a personal and intimate nature.

He responded,

"I've been advised by my attorney not to answer that
question, to take the Fifth Amendment."

(R. 1023, p. 354,

11. 24-25 and p. 355, 11. 1-5).
Mr. Merrill was asked if he had any objection to
Appellant rejoining Murray Parkway LLC, and developing the
project and he indicated "no."
16).

(R. 1023, p. 337, 11. 10-

Mr. Merrill also testified that in acquiring Murray

Parkway and developing the lots that it was the agreement
16
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between Merrill and the parties that each of the sons of the
Appellant and Appellee were to receive a building lot in the
development. (R. 1023, p. 340, 11. 12-25 and p. 341, 11. 14).

Mr. Merrill testified that the value of the property at

the time of its purchase was just as farmland and that it
had no value other than as a farm but that the Murray
Parkway, LLC had been successful in obtaining zoning and had
commenced the access and development of the project. (R.
1023, p. 342, 11. 4-22).

Appellant's counsel asked what the

value of the land was going to be once it was developed.
Appellee's counsel objected and the court sustained the
objection.

Further foundation was laid regarding Mr.

Merrill's previous experience in development projects and
his opinion was asked again as to what the ultimate value of
the property might be.

In response the following objection

and exchange occurred:
Ms. Donovan: Your honor, I would again object. I
believe, at this point it would be purely
speculative as to what the property might be worth
when it's completed.
The Court: I tend to agree.
the objection.

I am going to sustain

Q. (By Ms. Williams) Does the current value bear
any—well, let me rephrase that. The Murray Parkway
project will have much greater value once it's
17
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developed; is that true?
A. Yes.
Q. The current value is not representative of what
the future value will be?
A. Well, that's correct, because there aren't any
streets or
I mean there's
there's a lot of
money that needs to be spent on the improvement of
the property. So, yes, once all those roads are put
in, definitely, the value would be greater than it
would be now.
Q. And the return to you of your investments; is
that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So if we think of the property, not that you're
an inventor, but if we think of the property in
terms of someone who's
who's inventing a medical
device, it's something that you've paid for but you
don't know what the value in the future might be.
Is that what you're telling me?
A.

Correct.

(R. 1023, p. 343, 11. 21-25 and p. 344, 11. 1-24).
In addition, on another subject, Mr. Merrill testified
that he had issued a check for $32,000.00 to Appellee, doing
business as Reality Brokers Performance on February 16, 1996
which Mr. Merrill testified was lost or misplaced and a new
check was directed to Appellee on January 14, 1997.

(R.

1023, p. 346, 11. 16-25 and p. 347, 11. 1-4). Mr. Merrill
further testified that at the date of his testimony on
18
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

August 1, 1997 that the check had not cleared his Merrill
Title account.

(R. 1023, p. 349, 11. 8-15).

In addition, the Appellant's mother, Leone Parker,
testified that she and her husband gave Appellant the lot
upon which the parties' home at 6305 South 200 West was
built.

(R. 1023, p. 369, 11. 11-18).

She also testified

that she gave each of her children $10,000.00.

(R. 1023, p.

370, 11. 2-8). Lastly, as to the Murray Parkway property,
she testified that she sold her acreage to "Dale and Carla
Parker and Martin Merrill".

(R. 1023, p. 370, 11. 13-16).

Ms. Parker testified that her husband was born on the
property and that she and her husband had owned it since
approximately 1951 and that it had been passed down from his
family.

(R. 1023, p. 371, 11. 3-7). Ms. Parker testified

that she sold the property to Dale and Carla and Martin
Merrill because "Carla told me several times that they all
wanted ground close to home that he could build houses on."
(R. 1023, p. 371, 11. 18-23).

Ms. Leone Parker testified

that it was her intention that her son have a portion of the
property and that she would not have sold it if "Dale hadn't
been in it. And I would not have sold it if I had known a
divorce was coming up."

(R. 1023, p. 374, 11. 1-19).
19
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The Appellant was employed during the entirety of the
marriage, initially as a mechanic and then in the field of
construction.

Appellant went into business for himself as a

contractor in June of 1986, doing business as Aspen View
Homes.

(R. 1025, p. 658, 11. 8-22).

Though sometimes

people would come in with their own building lots and
request that Appellant build a home for them, his primary
source of work was the Appellee, as a realtor, finding
buyers or finding lots and Appellant building spec houses.
(R. 1025, p. 659, 11. 1-9). The Appellee testified that she
had been in the real estate business since 1981 and a
broker, doing business as Reality Brokers Performance since
1990. (R. 1022, p. 17, 11. 8-24).
In the course of the parties working together in
building and selling homes, there were numerous bank
accounts in one or the other's name, both at the date of
separation and the date of divorce. Appellant outlined the
accounts in Defendant's exhibits #7 and page six of #10,
which are attached as Addendum "M" and "J" respectively.
Appellant testified that he did not have check writing
privileges on the Realty Broker's account with First
Interstate Bank but that Appellee had check writing
20
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privileges on the Appellant's business account at Cyprus
Credit Union and that she regularly wrote checks out of that
account. (R. 1025, p. 667, 1. 25 and p. 668, 11. 1-10).
Also, the parties had a joint checking account with Cyprus
Credit Union (R. 1025, p. 668, 11. 11-18), and a separate
account under the name "Parker Enterprises" which business
entity owned and paid for vehicles and other miscellaneous
personalty.
11).

(R. 1025, p. 668, 11. 23-25 and p. 669, 11. 1-

The Parker Enterprises account was a joint account but

Appellee managed that account. Appellee was in charge of
paying the family bills, (R. 1025, p. 672, 11. 16-24) and
balancing the check books.

(R. 1025, p. 673, 11. 2-3).

Appellant's Exhibits 7 and 10 (Addendums "M" and "J") also
reveal various other bank accounts.

Defendant's Exhibit 7

outlines the summary of accounts at the date of separation
and at the date of divorce.
The accounts excluded the bank accounts for Murray
Parkway and Total Surprise, the parties' houseboat.

The

attachments to Defendant's Exhibit 7, document the account
balance at or about the parties' separation in October of
1995 and at the divorce in April of 1996. Appellant
testified that his business account (attachment D to Exhibit
21
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7), was depleted by the Appellee at the date of the parties'
separation by her removal of $71,000.00 from the account on
October 23, 1995; leaving $602.91 in the account. Appellee
unilaterally used those funds to pay off the line of credit
against the parties' residence.

(R. 1025, p. 690, 11. 5-9,

p. 683, 11. 24-25, and p. 684, 11. 1-20).

In addition, the

Appellant testified that he transferred this account to an
account in his own name at Cyprus Credit Union, account
#96770 and that he funded that account by borrowing
$10,000.00 against two of his credit cards, so that of the
$11,446.91 balance in the checking account at the time of
the parties' divorce, $10,000.00 was reflected with offsetting debt from the two credit cards.
11. 21-15 and p. 691, 11. 1-11).

(R. 1025, p. 690,

Appellant testified

through Defendant's exhibits 7 and 10, both of which were
received by the court with no objection from Respondent,
that at the date of separation Appellee took control and
maintained control of all of the accounts except for
Appellant's new Cyprus Credit Union account.
A review of the summary of ac_

its, as set forth in

Defendant's Exhibit 7, reveals that at separation Appellee
took control of accounts A, B, C, E, F, G, H and I or
22
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already had control of those accounts and "gutted" account
D.

The balances of those accounts of which Appellee had and

kept control totaled $134,516.49, as set forth below in the
illustration of Exhibit 7, which illustration includes the
balance at separation of each account and by whom it was
received, and the balance at divorce and by whom it was
received.

For purposes of the illustration, however, the

Appellant has reduced the business account #96770, Cyprus
Credit Union, "D" by the $10,000.00 debt that offset it in
Exhibit 10. As outlined below, at separation, the Appellant
was left with $688.41 and Appellee was left with
$134,516.49.

At the date of divorce, the balance in the

accounts in control of Appellee was then $36,986.74 and the
balance of Appellant's accounts totaled $1,735.37.
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS
RESTATEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 7
Exhibit

Account

A

Cyprus Credit
Union
Acct #74823
(Parker
Enterprises)

B

Cyprus Credit
Union
Acct#6591
(Joint Account)

Balance at
Separation

Plaintiffs
Possession

Defendant's 11 Balance at
Possession j|Divorce

$134.83

$134.83

$4,643.50

$4,643.50

II

Plaintiff's
Possession

$5942

$59.42

| | $2,74936
||
$515 89

$2,749.36
$515.89
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Defendant's
Possession

c

Cyprus Credit
Union
Acct #50830

D

Cyprus Credit
Union
Acct #57172 and
Acct #96770

E

Zions Bank
Acct#017370586
(Plaintiff's
Personal Account)

F

$102,041.91

$102,041.91

$688.41

-1

1 $3,829.98

$688.41

$3,829.98

$1,446.91
$288.46

$1,446.91
$288.46

$1,756.17

$1,756.17

1 $16,347.25

$16,347.25

First Interstate
Bank
Acct#21042197
(Realty Brokers
Performance)

$20,104.08

$20,104.08

$10,089.84

$10,089.84

G

Key Bank
Acct#
440690002777
(Sunrise Flats)

$2,077.00

$2,077.00

$250.00

$250.00

H

First Interstate
Bank
Acct #21186416
(Dove Hollow
Savings)

$3,106.00

$3,106.00

$3,145.00

$3,145.00

I

First Interstate
Bank
Acct #21043708
(Dove Hollow
Checking)

$653.00

$653.00

$135,204.90

$134,516.49

Totals

1

n/a

$688.41 | $38,720.61 1 $36,986.74

In support of the Appellant's position in regard to the
bank accounts, Appellant called an expert witness, Robert
Miller, a CPA.

Mr. Miller testified using Defendant's

Exhibit 7 which had been prepared by Mr. Miller, Appellant

24
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$1,735.37

and Appellant's counsel, Mr. Miller testified that
Defendant's Exhibit 7. represented the cash balances in the
respective accounts taken either directly from the accounts
or as could be imputed as best he could from the statements
and records that were available. (R. 1024, p. 556, 11. 1624) . Mr. Miller testified that he reviewed the bank account
statements from each of the accounts and looked for crossaccount transfers and transactions.

(R. 1024, p. 557, 11.

4-24) . Mr. Miller testified that he reviewed account
records over a period of months; primarily from the date of
separation through the date of divorce and a few months
subsequent as well.

(R. 1024, p. 558, 11. 1-8). Mr. Miller

carefully went through the exhibit explaining his dollar
balances and any corrections or reductions based on
transfers between accounts.
1025, p. 608-609).

(R. 1024, p. 558-567, and R.

Mr. Miller also testified that he

reviewed tax returns for Sunrise Flats, Dove Hollow, Murray
Parkway, Reality Brokers Performance, Parkers Enterprises
and Reality Brokers Service Corporation and that Exhibit 10
set forth the accounts in the marital estate at April 15,
1996.

(R. 1024, p. 575, 11. 3-14).

Mr. Miller went on to

explain the numerous distributions that the Appellee had
25
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received in her separate accounts from the investment
entities Sunrise Flats and Dove Hollow, (R. 1025, p. 612613) outlining the unaccounted for funds that Appellee had
received from Sunrise Flats on December 20, 1995 for
$7,250.00, and the unaccounted for funds Appellee had
received from Sunrise Flats on November 6, 1995 for
$41,991.91.
19).

(R. 1025, p. 615, 11. 18-25 and p. 616, 11. 1-

Mr. Miller testified that as receivables or funds

received by Appellee and unaccounted for in the bank
accounts, these were additional monies which should have
been divided at the date of the divorce.

(R. 1024, p 574,

11 14-25.)
The parties had stipulated to the entry a Temporary
Order, but, on December 22, 1995, less than two months after
the filing of the Complaint for Divorce, a Motion for
Bifurcation was filed by the Appellee.

(R. 38-39.)

In

support of the Motion, Appellee filed a Memorandum, in which
Appellee stated that "An immediate Decree of Divorce will
eliminate the risk of claims by Defendant that investments
Plaintiff has or property Plaintiff acquires in the future
or assets which appreciate in value should be part of the
marital estate, and therefore subject to equitable
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distribution." (R. 43). However, neither at that time nor
at any later time prior to trial did the court allocate or
actually award particular items of personal property, real
property or money assets to either of the parties. At the
date of the filing of the Motion, however, as has been set
forth above, the Appellee had the "lion's share" of the real
property in her name or control, and the business
investments and bank accounts in her name alone or with a
partner, exclusive of Appellant, even though the particular
assets were all marital assets.
The parties appeared at the time of hearing on a Motion
for Bifurcation on February 13, 1996 and by Minute Entry
Decision the Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr.,
recommended the granting of the bifurcation.

(R. 92). In

response, an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation
was filed by Appellant.

Specifically, in the Objection, the

Appellant asked that the court not grant the bifurcation
because the Appellant believed that Appellee had been
holding assets and monies pending the divorce so that she
could take proceeds as her sole property.

In other words,

Appellant alleged that Appellee had been doing "divorce
planning" and the Appellant would be prejudiced thereby.
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(R. 100) .
The Order Bifurcating the parties' divorce was entered
by the court on March 6, 1996. (R. 119-121).

Thereafter and

by Minute Entry, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration, the judge denied the Appellant's
Objection to Recommendation indicating that the Appellant
would not be prejudiced by the Court's granting of the
bifurcation, since at the time of trial the court would have
the authority to divide all assets owned or accumulated
prior to the granting of the divorce. (R. 122-24).

This

Minute Entry was reduced to a court order and entered April
1, 1996.

(R. 130-32).

The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact were signed
by the court and entered April 15, 1996.

The Decree of

Divorce severed the marital relationship, but all issues
were reserved for trial.

(R. 136-37).

Given the bifurcated divorce and a disagreement between
counsel as to the appropriate valuation date for purpose of
the upcoming trial, the parties agreed that a pre-trial
hearing was necessary for purpose of determining the
valuation date. Appellant and Appellee each filed
memorandums of law regarding the valuation date.
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Within Appellant's Memorandum, Appellant argued that in
order to attain an equitable distribution of the marital
assets, the marital estate should be valued at the time of
trial and that the court had discretion to determine what
date of valuation would provide the most equitable
distribution.

Given the fact that Appellee had filed the

divorce and the Motion for Bifurcation quickly, appeared to
be engaged in divorce planning, including the forging of the
Appellant's name on a Quit Claim Deed, and had control of
the marital monies and real properties, the Appellant argued
that the trial date should be used for the valuation of the
marital estate.

(R. 355-83) (A copy of this memorandum is

attached as Addendum "N").

The motion came on for hearing

on July 11, 1997 and the court determined that the date of
the bifurcated divorce would be the valuation date, "unless
assets were hidden or tried to be hidden or marital assets
were used to increase the value of something they have."
(R. 384). The order arising from that hearing was signed by
the court February 26, 1998.

(R. 724-26).

Subsequent to trial held on July 31, 1997, August 1,
1997, October 23, 1997, October 24, 1997 and October 28,
1997, the court took the matter under advisement and a
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Minute Entry decision was issued by the court on December
10, 1997. This Minute Entry was later contained in
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a
Supplemental Decree of Divorce dated April 27, 1998.

(R.

803-37) . Prior to the Minute Entry decision, the Appellant
filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to
Reopen Case in chief to take additional testimony.

The

Motion was brought by Appellant due to actions taken on the
part of the Appellee to sell real estate that was admittedly
part of the marital estate and the apparent receipt and
deposit by the Appellee of a $32,000.00 commission which she
earned at or about the time of the parties' divorce.
675-714).

(R.

At the time of trial, Martin Merrill testified

that Appellee had refused the commission.
11. 21-25).

(R. 1023, p. 347,

Appellee's witness, Kevin Gates testified that

the $32,000.00 commission had not been paid, to his
knowledge and that he believed that Appellee had waived her
commission.

(R. 1023, p. 229-230, 11. 22-25, 1-7).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The trial court's decision to bifurcate this divorce
action and later decision to use the bifurcation date as the
valuation date of the marital estate caused substantial
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prejudice to Appellant's right to an equitable share of the
marital estate and was an abuse of discretion. At April 15,
1996, the date of bifurcation, Appellee had control of eight
of the parties' nine bank accounts and most of the parties'
real estate, however, none of this property was actually
"divided" by an order of the court until the trial, over one
year after the bifurcation.

As none of the marital estate

was divided, it all remained "marital" until the trial.
Because Appellee was awarded all of the accounts under her
control, as well as the majority of the real estate
(including the parties' interest in the Murray Parkway
project), in addition to Appellee having the use and
enjoyment of the majority of the marital estate, Appellant
was not awarded any of the appreciation on these marital
assets from April 15, 1996 until October 28, 1997, the last
day of trial.
The trial court abused its discretion in not dividing
the parties' bank accounts, or the value thereof.

In

addition, the trial court erred in not putting a value of
said accounts, in spite of bank statements being admitted
into evidence, Appellant's expert testimony tracing the
funds, and Appellee's complete lack of evidence establishing
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the amounts in the accounts or controverting the amounts as
established by the evidence.
The trial court abused its discretion in not valuing the
parties' bank accounts as of the date of separation due to
Appellee's blatant dissipation of the marital estate and
hiding of the funds.
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding the
parties' entire marital interest in Murray Parkway, LLC, to
Appellee rather than dividing the membership interest
between the parties equitably, given that all of the
evidence presented, as well as the trial court's findings
establish that the value of the interest is speculative and
cannot be determined.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING A
BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE.
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the

trial court to bifurcate issues "in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice . . • ." Therefore, it
follows, that a bifurcation should not be granted where to
do so would cause prejudice to a party, not "avoid"
prejudice.

See Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d
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716, 730 (Utah App. 1990).

In Breuer this Court upheld the

bifurcation of the issue of the fair market rental value of
a property because the parties had entered a binding
stipulation and this issue was "irrelevant" to the other
claims and cross-claims.

799 P.2d at 730. However, in the

present case, the issues of the control, the use, the
appreciation of and the changes to the marital estate, as
well as the speculative value of the development project,
are not irrelevant to the subsequent division of the estate.
See Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., LTD., v. Smith7s Food &
Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App. 1994)
(affirming an order bifurcating the issues of damages and
liability in a breach of lease action because the change in
the value of the property was too "speculative," and the
nature of the property at the time of bifurcation
"encumbered by the lease, [was] completely different from
the property unencumbered by the lease").
Appellee moved to bifurcate this divorce action in
December of 1995, two months after filing for divorce. (R.
38).

Appellee supported this motion with a memorandum very

accurately arguing that "[a]n immediate Decree of Divorce
will eliminate the risk of claims by Defendant that
33
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investments

Plaintiff

the future or assets

has or property Plaintiff acquires in
which appreciate

in value

should be

part of the marital estate, and therefore, subject to
equitable distribution."

(R. 43) (emphasis added).

This is exactly what happened in this case; the decree
was entered, the de facto allocation of the assets benefited
the Appellee, and the Appellant was not allowed an equal or
equitable distribution of the marital estate.

This was a

twenty-five year marriage. Appellee did not bring any premarital property into the marriage.

However, Appellee

argued that a bifurcated decree would "eliminate the risk of
claims by Defendant that investments

Plaintiff

has or

property Plaintiff acquires in the future or assets
appreciate

in value

which

should be part of the marital estate,

and therefore, subject to equitable distribution." The
items in bold above, under all

Utah law, are part of the

marital estate and subject to equitable distribution.
Marsh v. Marsh,

P.2d

,

See

\

(1999 Utah App. 014)

("[M]arital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from
whatever source derived;'" (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576
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,

P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978))).

It is contrary to Utah's

entire body of law concerning marital property and its
equitable distribution to allow Appellee to use a bifurcated
decree to deny Appellant an equitable share of the marital
estate.
The trial court denied Appellant's request for a
hearing and entered the bifurcated divorce because
"Defendant will not be prejudiced by the Court's granting of
the bifurcation since at the time of the trial the Court
will have the authority to divide all assets owned or
accumulated prior to the granting of the divorce."
31).

(R. 130-

Therefore, without a hearing on the issue, and without

considering the prejudice to Appellant due to Appellee's
control of eight out of the parties' nine bank accounts and
a disproportionate share of the real estate holdings
(including the soon to be developed 33 acre Murray Parkway
Subdivision), the trial court entered the divorce, and later
established this date as the valuation date of the marital
estate.
Appellant is not arguing that bifurcated decrees should
not be entered in divorce proceedings.

Bifurcated divorce

decrees can serve the beneficial purpose of allowing parties
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to sever their legal marital relationship, as well as
allowing them to retain their post-bifurcation earnings and
invest them as they see fit.

However, a bifurcation should

not be employed to set the valuation date of the marital
estate where evidence as to the value and division of the
estate is not taken until over a year later.

Otherwise

severe prejudice will happen where one party has control of
most of the assets and bank accounts, as in the present
case.
This bifurcated decree was not entered "in furtherance
of convenience or to avoid prejudice" as proscribed by Rule
42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
caused

prejudice to Appellant.

The bifurcation

Therefore, the trial court

abused its discretion in bifurcating this action on April
15, 1996 and then subsequently using this date as the
valuation date of the marital estate where no division of
the estate was made until over one year later.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THAT
THE DATE OF VALUATION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WOULD BE
APRIL 15, 1996, THE DATE OF THE BIFURCATED DECREE,
RATHER THAN THE DATE OF TRIAL.
There is a general rule in Utah that the marital estate
should be "valued at the time of divorce or trial."
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Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994)
(citing Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App.
1993); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985);
accord Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah
1980); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987).
None of Utah's cases involve a trial court valuing a marital
estate at the date of a bifurcated

decree.

Each of these

cases dealt with the issue of whether to value the marital
estate at trial, or at the date of separation.
As to this body of case law, the general rule is
followed except where one party has "dissipated an asset,
hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively."

Peck,

738 P.2d at 1052; £££ also Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433
(affirming the trial court's use of a date other than the
date of divorce where one party utilized portions of the
marital estate for his own support and the other party had
little or no access to the liquid assets of the estate
during the pendency of the action); Andersen v. Andersen,
757 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988).

There is no rule or case law

which provides for a valuation date for the marital estate
when a bifurcated

divorce decree is entered.

Therefore, in

determining the valuation date for the marital estate, the
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trial court must determine which valuation date will provide
the most equitable distribution.
Subsequent to a hearing, the trial court ordered that
the marital estate would be valued as of April 15, 1996, the
date the bifurcated decree was entered.

However, there was

no division of the marital estate as of April 15, 1996, and
there was no evidence as to what the marital assets
consisted of, what their respective value was, nor was there
any temporary division of said assets. As set forth in the
statement of facts, the vast majority of these assets were
controlled by Appellee at April 15, 1996.

Therefore, the

trial court's decision manufactured an artificial date to
value to the marital estate, without dividing it, but in
doing so divided the estate de facto.
As most of the real property assets and eight out of
nine bank accounts were under Appellee's control and awarded
to her, all of the appreciation on these marital assets from
April 15, 1996 until the trial in October of 1997 were
awarded solely to Appellee because of this artificial date
of valuation and the defacto award of the asset by virtue of
possession of the asset at the date of the bifurcated
decree.
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Regardless of when the bifurcated order was entered,
since the marital assets were not divided by the court, all
of the marital assets remained marital assets until the
division of the assets at the trial and by the court's
minute entry decision.

Because these assets remained

marital assets until the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was
entered, the appreciation of these assets is also a marital
asset which should have been equitably divided by the trial
court.
By virtue of the trial court using April 15, 1996 as the
date of valuation of the marital estate, the trial court
effectively "divided" the estate as of that date, greatly
prejudicing the Appellant with regards to the parties'
interest in all of the marital assets, including the marital
interest in the Murray Parkway, LLC. As of April 15, 1996,
the land was still mostly undeveloped.

The pasture land

value of this property was far less than its development
value.

Both of the parties, the witness Martin Merrill, and

the court each commented on the speculative future value of
this project.

By valuing the Murray Parkway, LLC as of

April 15, 1996 even though there is no dispute that it was a
marital asset purchased for development from Appellant's
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family, the Appellant has been severally financially
prejudiced.
The trial court abused its discretion in using the date
of April 15, 1996 as the valuation date.

This defeats the

purpose and reasoning of prior cases that require the
valuation date be the date of "divorce" because the divorce
date is typically the date of trial which is when the assets
are actually divided.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
DIVIDE THE PARTIES' VARIOUS BANK ACCOUNTS BETWEEN THE
PARTIES OR THE VALUE THEREOF, GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL
MONIES INVOLVED AND THE FACT THAT APPELLEE CONTROLLED
NEARLY ALL OF THE MONEY IN SAID ACCOUNTS.
As stated above, in the Facts section, the parties'
maintained nine bank accounts between them.

The attachments

to Defense Exhibit 7 (Addendum "M") document the account
balance at or about the parties' separation in October of
1995 and at the divorce in April of 1996. At separation,
the Appellee had control of eight of these nine accounts.
The Appellant was left with $688.41 and Appellee was left
with $134,516.49. At the date of the bifurcated divorce
decree, the balance in the accounts in control of Appellee
was only $36,986.74 and the balance of Appellant totaled
$1,735.37.

Therefore, the accounts in Appellee's control
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diminished nearly $100,000.00 during the six months between
the parties' separation and the entry of the bifurcated
order.
In support of the Appellant's position in regards to the
bank accounts, Appellant's expert witness, Robert Miller,
testified that Defendant's Exhibit 7 represented the cash
balances in the respective accounts taken either directly
from the accounts or as could be imputed as best he could
from the statements and records that were available. Bank
statements were also admitted into evidence showing the
respective balances on the dates of separation and divorce.
In spite of this evidence and testimony as to the value
of these accounts at the different dates, the trial court
found that:
"[t]here is no specific accounting of all of the
bank accounts, however, either as to the source of
deposits or nature of expenditures, that will allow
the Court to accurately determine any net value of
the accounts to divide the same fairly. Therefore,
the Court awards each account to the holder of the
same, and makes no valuation for purposes of the
marital estate." (R. 82 9) (emphasis added).
However, Appellant did offer a very specific accounting of
the accounts, and Appellee testified that she did not
because Appellant had "already provided an accounting in his
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exhibits about what was in [her] accounts." (R. 1024, p.
537, 11. 14-17).

;

Appellee called no experts to testify

regarding the parties' bank accounts and submitted the
following limited testimony as evidence concerning the bank
accounts:
(Appellee's Counsel): Let me talk to you a little
bit about these bank accounts, Ms. Parker, and,
again, calling your attention to our Exhibit 4-A,
if you'd turn to that page. There's been testimony
during the course of the trial about the bank
accounts and what was in there or what was in there
the day after the divorce, and you heard the
accountant testify about that.
This deposit, the $17,452.51 deposit that was
made on April 16, 1996, do you remember when I
asked Mr. Miller, showing him your check register
to show that taxes were paid with the money?
A.

(Appellee): Yes.

Q.

And is that your recall as well?

A. Yes. I paid the — I wrote the check out for
the IRS and the state on April 15th, but didn't
make the deposit until the 16th.
Q. Okay. And is it your position that that
deposit certainly shouldn't be included in the bank
A. Yes.
Q. - - accounts? What is your position with
respect to your business accounts being included at
all?
A. Well, I - - I don't see how there's any way even
feasible to include them. Each of the entities
i
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have their own expenses and cash flow that run
through the accounts. It would be really hard to
even determine what was in there from one day to
another. But the account -- the business accounts
are operating capital for each entity.
Q. And expenses are paid out of those accounts?
A.

Exactly.

(R. 1026, p. 890-91, 11. 1-25, 1-4).

The only other testimony offered by Appellee as to the value
of the accounts came on redirect:
Q. (Appellee's Counsel) And is it your testimony
that your ex-husband has already provided an
accounting in his exhibits about what was in your
accounts?
A.

(Appellee) Yes. (R. 1024, p. 537, 11. 14-17).

The Appellee made no effort whatsoever to trace the funds
she received at the separation or divorce.

Her testimony

was limited and vague.
"The trial court must make findings on all material
issues, and its failure to do so constitutes reversible
error 'unless the facts in the record are clear
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment.'"

Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 8 6,

87 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d
996, 999 (Utah 1983); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236
(Utah 1983)).

"[T]he trial court's failure to include
43
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property valuations in divorce actions may constitute an
abuse of discretion sufficient to require remand for
determination,"

Id. at 88 (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d

1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); Boyle v. Boyle. 735 P.2d 669, 671
(Utah App. 1987)J1; £££ also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116,
119 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a marital property
distribution must be based on adequate findings and "[t]hese
findings must place a dollar value on the distributed
assets'7) (emphasis added) .
In Carlton, the marital assets included ''at least
thirteen different stocks and bonds, six savings accounts,
four checking accounts" and numerous other assets.

Id.

The

evidence and testimony admitted at trial by the parties'
contested the value of these accounts.

Id.

The trial court

failed to place specific values on the accounts.

Id.

This

Court found that "the facts in the record are not * clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in
favor of the judgment.'" Id. at 89 (quoting Acton, 737 P.2d
at 999). Accordingly, this Court held "that the trial

1

Note in Jones and Boyle the court affirmed the trial court'sfindingseven though
lacking values because the Appellant's counsel in each case drafted the findings. In the
present case, Appellee's counsel drafted the findings.
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court's failure to make findings as to the value of the
parties' assets constitutes reversible error requiring this
Court to remand for entry of additional findings." Id.
In Munns the trial court "was so concerned with finding
the appropriate property values that, when the valuation
evidence was inadequate, it continued the hearing for
further appraisal information."

790 P.2d at 119.2

In Munns

the Appellant failed to enter the necessary evidence at
trial, and appealed the trial court's decision to accept the
Appellee's proposed valuation of the property.

Id.

In the present case, as stated above, Appellant
submitted the relevant bank statements and the expert
testimony of a CPA, as well as his own testimony and
numerous exhibits. Appellee did not admit any evidence,
other than the aforementioned statement that "it would be
really hard to even determine what was in there from one day
to another."

However, the difficulty of the valuation of a

marital asset is not an adequate justification for the trial
court to refuse to value said asset.
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, the trial court was faced with

2

Appellant moved to reopen the case to take additional testimony, however this
motion was denied by the trial court on May 29, 1998. (R. 843).
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the difficulty of valuing goodwill in a company pursuant to
a property distribution in a divorce.
App. 1989).

769 P.2d 820 (Utah

The trial court placed a value on the goodwill

of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice.
Sorensen appealed.

Id. at 824. Dr.

One of the arguments which Dr. Sorensen

made on appeal was that goodwill should not be considered in
the distribution of the marital estate because it was
difficult to value.

Id. at 828.

In response to this

argument, this Court stated that this was the "most
unpersuasive argument."

Id.

Further, this Court stated

that "the mere fact that goodwill may be difficult to value
or elusive in nature, does not justify ignoring or
disregarding it altogether in the valuation of marital
property."

Id.

In the present case, Appellant presented evidence, the
relevant bank statements, as well as the expert testimony of
a CPA, as to the value of the respective marital accounts at
the relevant dates.

This evidence was only controverted by

cross3 and Appellee's statement that the accounts would be
difficult to value. Appellant submits that his evidence on
this issue was "clear and uncontroverted."
3

The burden then

The cross of Mr. Miller, the CPA, can be found at R. 1025, T. 626-647.
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shifted to the Appellee to provide evidence to the trial
court as to what the balances of the accounts were, from
what sources, and where the money went.

She failed

completely to establish any of these criteria.
The trial court's failure to place a value on these
marital assets and to simply award them to the party who had
control of them, given that Appellee had control of the vast
majority of these accounts, severally prejudiced the
Appellant, imbalanced the division of the marital estate,
and is an abuse of discretion and reversible error. See
Carlton, 756 P.2d at 89; Munns, 790 P.2d at 119; Boyle, 735
P.2d at 671; Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
VALUE THE PARTIESf BANK ACCOUNTS AT THE DATE OF
SEPARATION DUE TO APPELLEE'S EXTREME DISSIPATION OF
THESE MARITAL ASSETS.
The general rule is that the marital estate should be
valued as of the entry of the divorce decree or trial. See
Berger, 713 P.2d at 697; Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262; Peck,
738 P.2d at 1052; Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah
App. 1989).

"However, in the exercise of its equitable

powers, a trial court has broad discretion to use a
different date, such as the date of separation, when
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circumstances warrant."

Shepherd, 876 P.2d 432-33 (citing

Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052) (emphasis added).

"[W]here one

party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or
otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under
its broad discretion, value the property at an earlier date,
i.e. separation."

Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052 (citations

omitted) (emphasis added).
In Shepherd this Court affirmed the trial court in
valuing the marital estate at the time of separation where
one party to the divorce:
"utilized portions of the marital estate for his
own support during the pendency of the action and
the defendant had no access to the liquid assets
during that period . . . . plaintiff not only
enjoyed the benefit of the use of the marital
assets for his own support, but also enjoyed the
income and other benefits derived from the marital
assets during the pendency of the action . . . .
plaintiff depleted the liquid assets of the marital
estate . . . ." 876 P.2d at 433.
These same factors are present in the case at bar.
Through Defense Exhibit 7 (Addendum M), the Appellant
showed which accounts were in Appellee's control and which
was in Appellant's control at both the date of separation,
and the date of the bifurcated decree.

This exhibit also

showed the balances of these nine accounts as determined by
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the relevant bank statements, exhibits, and the expert
testimony of Mr. Miller, CPA.
At separation, the Appellee had control of eight of
these nine accounts.

The Appellant was left with $688.41

and Appellee was left with $134,516.49. At the date of the
bifurcated divorce decree, the balance in the accounts in
control of Appellee was only $36,986.74 and the balance of
Appellant totaled $1,735.37. Therefore, the marital
accounts in Appellee's control diminished nearly $100,000.00
during the six months between the parties' separation and
the entry of the bifurcated order.

It should be noted that

during this time, Appellee's income was approximately
$8,333.00 per month according to a Verified Motion and Child
Support Worksheet submitted in October of 1995.

(R. 9-15).

Appellee's expenses were approximately $6,606.80 per month
as claimed in her Financial Declaration.

(R. 164).

However, even with this surplus monthly income, Appellee
testified that she wrote $35,000.00 worth of checks out to
herself which she "lived off" in November of 1995.

(R.

1024, p. 464-65, 11. 18-25, 1-3). Another check was written
out to herself on November 6, 1995 for $62,991.91 that
Appellee testified she used to "live on."

(R. 1024, p. 466,
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11. 6-17).

Later, concerning this additional $63,000.00,

Appellee testified that:
A. (Appellee): I don't remember what I did with it.
It wouldn't -- it wouldn't have been spent all in
one place. It wouldn't be something I'd remember.
(R. 1024, p. 467, 11. 6-8).
This enormous amount of money out of the parties' marital
estate was dissipated or hidden by Appellee from the date
Appellee filed for divorce in October of 1995 through the
end of that year.
Further, on October 23, 1995, eight days before filing
for divorce, Appellee nearly emptied this Appellant's only
account by writing a $71,000.00 check to pay off a home
equity line of credit which Appellant was using to fund his
business.

(R. 1024, p. 491, 11. 14-24).

Only $602.00 was

left in the only account Appellant had access to.

(R. 1024,

p. 492, 11. 12-16).
This blatant dissipation of the marital estate and
"divorce planning" which Appellee used to hide all of the
parties' liquid assets and leave Appellant with only $602.00
required that the trial court use the date of separation to
value the marital bank accounts.

See Peck, 738 P.2d at

1052; Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO
DIVIDE THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN MURRAY PARKWAY LLC.
EQUALLY GIVEN THAT THE VALUE OF THE INTEREST WAS
DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE AND SPECULATIVE.
A property division made by the trial court will not be

upheld "where to do so would work a manifest injustice or
inequity."

Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986)

(citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982).

In

addition, property distributions will be overturned where
the trial court fails to follow the standards set by the
appellate courts.

Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 273 (Utah

App. 1993) (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198
(Utah App. 1992); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah
App. 1990)) .
A.

The Trial Court's Distribution Of The Parties'
Entire Interest In The Murray Parkway Subdivision
To The Appellee Must Be Overturned As The
Distribution Failed To Follow The Standards Set By
The Appellate Courts.

One standard which has been established by the appellate
courts is that in fairly dividing a marital estate, if the
value of a business interest or stock is disputed and varies
widely, "in order to protect the parties, and eliminate
altogether the considerable problems in determining value,
the in-kind division of [the interest] [is] the proper
51
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solution."

Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah

1983).
In Savage, the parties valued shares of stock in a
closely held corporation between $899,340.00 and
$4,072,000.00.

l£L. at 1203.

Due to the enormous disparity

between the values forwarded by the parties, the trial court
awarded each party an interest in the stock.

Id.

The

Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the award as it was
"impossible to deal fairly with the parties in any other
way." JsL. at 1205.
"Wherever possible, this Court avoids division of
marital stock between parties because it forces them to be
in a ^close economic relationship which has every potential
for further contention, friction, and litigation, especially
when third parties having nothing to do with the divorce
will also necessarily be involved."

Argyle v. Arayle, 688

P.2d 468 (Utah 1984) (quoting Savage, 658 P.2d at 1206
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).

This basic rule is applicable

where, in cases such as Argyle, a couple has a business
which is capable of being accurately valued.

However, where

the value is more difficult to determine and speculative, as
in the present case, Utah courts have held that the only
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equitable solution is to divide the stock or interest
between the divorcing couple.

See Savage, 658 P.2d 1201;

Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987).
In Savage, the husband had a one-third interest in a
family owned coal and lumber company.

658 P.2d at 1202.

When the couple divorced, the trial court heard differing
testimony as to the value of the interest.

Id. at 1203-04.

The contrasting valuations were due to the difficulty in
determining the worth of shares in a closely-held
corporation.

Id. at 1203.

The trial court determined, and

the Supreme Court of Utah upheld, that because the evidence
concerning the valuation of the corporation was credible on
both sides "any cash distribution risked doing substantial
injustice to one party."

Id. at 1205.

Following this

reasoning, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the division
of the corporate stock between the divorcing couple was the
proper solution.

Id.

A similar situation occurred in Lee.

In Lee, the

husband had a 52% interest in a business and at divorce the
trial court awarded him the full 52%. 744 P.2d at 1381. At
trial, the parties disagreed as to the value of business.
Id. At the appellate level, the case was remanded with the
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appellate court stating that "[i]f the trial court, because
of the great disparity of testimony, was unable to assign a
value to [the business], then the court could have made an
in-kind distribution of [the business] stock to the wife."
Id.

The present case is analogous to both Lee and Savage.
A substantial portion of the marital estate, in the

present case, consists of a 50% interest in Murray Parkway,
LLC.

As stated in the Facts section above, the land was

purchased by the LLC due to Appellant's contacts and labor.
The land was purchased from Appellant's family with the
understanding that Appellant would be a co-owner and also be
the builder of the homes in the subdivision.
The subdivision, as an undeveloped

property,

was

appraised by Mr. Webber at approximately $32,000 per acre.
However, this appraisal did not consider that this property
was in the process of becoming a developed property.
According to Appellant and Mr. Merrill, the property has far
greater value as a development. (R. 1023, p. 344, 11. 3-8).
However, this value is extremely difficult to accurately
determine, due to it being a closely held corporation as
well as the difficulty in valuing developing land, much the
same as the difficulties in both Savage and Lee. Therefore,
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due to the speculative nature of valuing closely held
corporations and land developments, the marital interest in
Murray Parkway, LLC should be divided between the parties
because "any cash distribution risk[s] doing substantial
injustice to one party."

Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205.

Another analogous case with regards to the distribution
of a speculative marital asset is Naranjo v. Naranjo.
P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).

751

In Naranjo, one of the parties

to a divorce action had purchased some National Military
Underwriters stock.

Id. at 1149.

The trial court found

that the value of the interest in the stock at the time of
trial was "unknown."

Id.

Due to the speculative and

unknown value of the stock, the trial court awarded each
party one-half of the stock.

Id.

This Court affirmed

stating that "[a]n in-kind distribution of closely-held
corporate stock is appropriate where the evidence fails to
establish the stock's value."
at 1204-05).

Id.

(citing Savage, 658 P.2d

Further, this Court stated that "[i]t would be

inappropriate, given the speculative nature of the
investment . . . for [one party] to receive all of the stock
and [the other party] to receive offsetting property."

Id.

The trial court found that "it is impossible to project
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[the] future value" of the Murray Parkway Subdivision.
830).

(R.

In addition, when Appellant offered evidence as to

the value of the interest in developing the Murray Parkway
Subdivision, Appellee objected on the basis of the
development's speculative nature and the trial court
sustained the objections.
Appellee's Council: Your honor, I would again
object. I believe, at this point it would be purely
speculative as to what the property might be worth
when it's completed.
The Court: I tend to agree.
the objection.

I am going to sustain

(R. 1023, p. 343, 11. 21-25).
The trial court valued the Murray Parkway Subdivision as
undeveloped land.

Only the value of one-half of the

parties' equity in the property at April 15, 1996 was
divided in the property distribution, even though both
parties, witnesses for both parties, and the findings
entered by the trial court all acknowledge that the property
was bought for and in the process of being developed.

It is

contrary to all common sense that the 33 acres would be
valued as undeveloped land when, even prior to April 15,
1996, the property was already in the process of early
development.

(See excerpts from Plaintiff's Exhibit 59
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Addendum "0") /
Appellee made initial inquiries into attaining this
property for development in 1991 or 1992.
1).

(Addendum "0", p.

The recommendation to rezone the property for a single

family residential development was attained on January 10,
1995. (IdL at 2, 8). By April 24, 1995, Mr. Merrill
requested an initial environmental assessment of the project
by JBR Environmental Consultants, Inc.

(Id. at 9). JBR

completed the first phase of this assessment by May 30,
1995. (Id. at 11). Upon receiving an application for the
development from Appellee, the Murray City Attorney, on July
10, 1995, recommended that the development be approved by
the Salt Lake County Flood Control Organization.
13).

(Id. at

The parties separated in mid-October of 1995. On

November 21, 1995, the Salt Lake County Public Works
Department gave the development preliminary approval.

(Id.

at 14). On April 15, 1996, the Army Corps of Engineers
notified Mr. Merrill that a permit would not be required for

4

It should also be noted that the Murray Parkway project will consist of 113
building lots, Appellee did testify as to the value of one residential building lot in South
Jordan. She testified that it was worth $50,000.00, "and that's very conservative." (R.
1022, T. 54,11. 4-11). Therefore, assuming that only 100 lots will be developed, at
$50,000.00 per lot, that totals $5,000,000.00.
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the development as the property had already been inspected
in 1992.

(Ifl, at 15). The bifurcated decree of divorce was

entered on April 15, 1996.

On October 7, 1997, the Murray

City Planning Staff recommended to the Murray City Planning
Commission that Phase One of the development project be
approved subject to certain conditions.

(Id. at 16).

The supplemental findings entered on April 27, 1998
state that "although the property is a marital asset, it is
impossible to project future value . . . ."

(R. 830). This

is by no means a justification for not valuing and equitably
distributing a marital asset or interest.

For example, this

is often the case with retirement accounts and why they are
divided one-half to each party rather than offset against
some other marital asset.
In discussing similar difficulties with valuing
retirement accounts, the Supreme Court of Utah stated that
"where no present value can be established and the parties
are unable to reach agreement, resort must be had to a form
of deferred distribution based upon fixed percentages."
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982) (quoting
Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 1981))/ See
also Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 828 (holding that the argument
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that goodwill in a dental practice should not be subject to
equitable distribution because it was difficult to value was
the "most unpersuasive argument," and "the mere fact that
goodwill may be difficult to value or elusive in nature,
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altogether in
the valuation of marital property,")
All of the relevant witnesses testified that the Murray
Parkway property was an investment and that they intended to
realize a profit on the property.

Appellant testified that

he expected that the development of the property would
realize between one and two million dollars in profit,5 and
Appellee's witness, Mr* Merrill, testified that the project
would have a much greater value once it was developed. (R.
1023, p. 344, 11. 3-8).
"Whether that resource is subject to distribution
does not turn on whether the spouse can presently
use or control it, or on whether the resource can
be given a present dollar value. The essential
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or
asset has accrued in whole or in part during the
marriage. To the extent that the right has so
accrued it is subject to equitable distribution."
Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432-33.
The interest in the property was acquired by the parties

5

R. 1026, T. 771,11. 7-10, this testimony was objected to and the objection was
sustained.
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during the marriage and the right to develop the property
accrued "in whole or in part" during the marriage. The
right to develop a piece of raw land in Murray City is
certainly a right to a benefit, even if a future benefit,
which is subject to equitable distribution.

As stated in

Woodwardf where a present value on a future benefit is
difficult to ascertain, some distribution according to fixed
percentages should be employed.

Therefore, as applied to

the parties' interest in the right to the benefit of
developing the Murray Parkway property, where the trial
court found that "it is impossible to project [the] future
value"6 of the development property, the trial court abused
its discretion by not dividing the parties' interest in this
marital asset on a percentage basis of the interest
according to the standards set by the appellate courts in
Savage and Lee.
B.

The Trial Court's Distribution Of The Parties'

Entire Interest in The Murray Parkway Subdivision
To The Appellee Must Be Overturned As The
Distribution Caused A Manifest Injustice Or
Inequity.
A property division made by the trial court will not be
upheld "where to do so would work a manifest injustice or
6

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f21, (R. 830).
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inequity."

Puseyr 728 P.2d at 119 (citing Turner, 649 P.2d

at 8). The Murray Parkway development is a primary marital
asset in this case.

The land that is in the process of

being developed was acquired from Appellant's parents and
distant relatives. As testified to by the parties, and Mr.
Merrill, and as found by the trial court, the value of this
marital interest is very speculative.
Appellant testified that he believed the development
would realize between one and two million dollars in profit.
(R. 1026, T. 771, 11. 7-10).

Appellee objected to this

testimony, and the objection was sustained, due to
Appellant's lack of expertise in development projects. In
addition when Appellee's witness, Mr. Merrill (who holds the
other 50% interest in the Murray Parkway LLC), was asked
concerning the project's development value this exchange
occurred:
Q. (Appellant's Counsel) Does the current value
bear any — well let me rephrase that. The Murray
Parkway project will have much greater value once
it's developed; is that true?
A.

(Mr. Merrill) Yes.

Q. The current value is not representative of what
the future value will be?
A.

Well, that's correct, because there aren't any
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streets or — I mean, there's — there's a lot of
money that needs to be spent on the improvement of
the property. So, yes, once all of those roads are
put in, definitely, the value would be greater than
it is now.
Q. And the return to you on your investment; is
that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q. So if we think of the property, not that you're
an inventor, but if we think of the property in
terms of someone who's — who's inventing a medical
device, it's something that you've paid for but you
don't know what the value in the future might be.
Is that what you're telling me?
A. Correct. (R. 1023, p. 344, 11. 3-24)
added).

(emphasis

In addition, Mr. Merrill, who testified that the Murray
Parkway project is the fourth subdivision development that
he's been involved in, 7 also testified on direct that:
"Murray city has given the preliminary approval of
the entire project. I haven't had the formal city
council final approval for phase one, but through
all of the various entities that need to approve
the subdivision plat of Murray City, basically,
they've all given their -- their final approval."
(R. 1023, p. 321, 11. 8-13) .

Even at April 15, 1996, when the bifurcated decree was
entered, substantial steps had been taken to attain

7

R. 1023, p. 343,11. 3-9.
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development approval of this project*

(Addendum "0").

Despite all of this uncontroverted evidence establishing
that the property was in the process of being developed and
the difference in the property's value as raw or potentially
developed, the trial court accepted and valued the property
as raw, undeveloped land and awarded it to Appellee*

Such

an award should not be upheld due to the "manifest
injustice" and "inequity" inflicted on the Appellant-

See

Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119; Turner, 649 P.2d at 8).
By valuing the development project as simple raw land in
spite of the uncontroverted intent and development efforts,
the trial court failed to consider a valuable marital asset
in its division.

This would be the equivalent of valuing a

business only as desks, chairs, and phones with no
consideration given to profitability, goodwill, or rights to
future benefits.
As argued above, "[m]arital property is ordinarily all
property acquired during the marriage and it ^encompasses
all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties,
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting
Englert, 576 P.2d at 1276)•

This includes accounts
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receivable, tangible assets, and goodwill in a company.

Id.

at 1318 (citing Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 832). In addition,
the marital estate includes "the right to a future income .
. . where the right is derived from products produced during
the marriage, even in cases
easily

valued."

where that

right

cannot

be

Id. (emphasis added)(citing Moon v. Moonr

790 P.2d 52, 56-57 (Utah App. 1990)/ Sorensen, 769 P.2d at
827/ Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432-33).
In Dunn the trial court determined that the wife did not
have a marital interest in the husband's royalty rights for
his inventions of surgical instruments which were invented
during the marriage.

Id. at 1319.

The husband argued that

the inventions came as a result of 2 6 years of education and
training, most of which predated the marriage.

Id.

This

Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in not
awarding the wife one-half of the value of this future
royalty interest as a marital asset.

Id.

This is analogous to the present case. Mr. Merrill, the
only witness, who is experienced in development projects,
agreed that the rights to the future profits in a
development project were analogous to the rights of an
invention where you put in the time initially and then reap
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the benefits in the future.
above).

(See excerpt of testimony

In this case, as submitted by the Appellee,

extensive efforts to develop the Murray Parkway project
occurred prior to trial, prior to the bifurcated order, and
prior to the separation of the parties.

(Addendum "0").

These marital efforts created a right to the future benefit
of the proceeds of this project.
The trial court's award of the parties' entire interest
in the Murray Parkway project to the Appellee, with an
offset to Appellant at the raw undeveloped value of the
property, was an abuse of discretion and was manifestly
unjust and inequitable.

"[An] in-kind division . . . was

[the] proper solution."

Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205.

CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, Appellant requests that this
Court reverse the trial court on the issues presented and
order that (1) the marital estate, with the possible
exception of the parties' bank accounts, be valued at the
date of trial; (2) that due to Appellee's dissipation of the
parties' bank accounts, that these bank accounts be valued
as of the date of separation, one-half to each party, which
65
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

requires an adjustment in favor of Appellant in the sum of
$66,914.04; and (3) that due to the substantial yet
speculative nature of the value of the parties' interest in
Murray Parkway, LLC, that the parties' 50% membership
interest be divided one-half to each.

Further, Appellant

requests his costs on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 1999.
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